BACKGROUND: SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN NEPAL
Historical Context of Media-Driven Movements
Nepal’s history of political change has often been intertwined with media, from the 2006 People’s Movement that ended King Gyanendra’s direct rule to the 2008 transition to a Republic (Dahal, 2025). Traditional media—radio, newspapers, and television—played a pivotal role in shaping public opinion during these periods. However, the advent of digital platforms has shifted the dynamics of activism. According to the Nepal Telecommunications Authority (NTA), only 9% of Nepal’s population had internet access in 2010, but by 2015, this figure had risen significantly, with estimates suggesting around 46% penetration (NTA, 2015). By 2020,widespread internet access to 90% (NTA,2021) and affordable smartphones had made social media a primary platform for public discourse, particularly among the youth. The 2013 Occupy Baluwatar movement was a precursor to Nepal’s digital activism, using platforms like Twitter and Facebook to highlight gender-based violence. Baluwatar is the official residence of Prime Minister of Nepal. The Occupy Baluwatar campaigners came from diverse social, economic, political and professional backgrounds. The campaigners were praised for being vibrant, enthusiastic and committed and for being able to unite for a cause despite their diversity (Koyu &Pokharel, 2014). Led by young activists, the campaign demonstrated social media’s ability to set public agendas overlooked by mainstream media. Similarly, during the 2015 earthquake, youth leveraged digital platforms for relief coordination, bypassing traditional media’s slower response. The #GoBackIndianMedia campaign in 2015, protesting sensationalist coverage by Indian outlets, further showcased social media’s capacity to influence public sentiment and hold media accountable. In the 2017 and 2022 elections, campaigns like #NoNotAgain and #EnoughisEnough gained traction on social media but had limited political impact. However, the 2022 Kathmandu mayoral election of Balendra Shah (Balen) highlighted the growing influence of digital platforms, with outlets like Routine of Nepal Banda (RONB) and Men’s Room Reloaded (MRR) mobilising voters (Dahal, 2023). These examples illustrate the increasing centrality of social media in Nepal’s socio-political sphere, laying the groundwork for the 2025 Gen Z movement, which one observer noted was “built upon this very foundation”.
The Rise of Gen Z and Digital Platforms
Nepal’s Gen Z (aged 13–28 in 2025- born between-) has grown up in a digital era with unprecedented access to global information and communication tools. Unlike older generations, Gen Z views social media not only as a source of entertainment but also as a platform for activism and social transformation.Before that, social media was considered as the platform of civic space in Nepal. Platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and Discord have become spaces for political expression, bypassing traditional media’s gatekeeping (U. Shrestha,personal communication, September 25,2025).The 2025 Gen Z movement’s leaderless and scattered nature is evident in participant reflections, such as: “There was no formal organisation. Coordination was lacking; everything was scattered. We had a meeting on the 7th, but it wasn’t about breaking barricades or forming a government” (Dhungana, 2025).
This underscores the spontaneous mobilisation enabled by digital platforms like Discord.
The movement marked a turning point, as Gen Z transformed these platforms into toolsfor organising protests and shaping political narratives, challenging the dominance of mainstream media. These efforts reflect McQuail’s short-term unplanned media effects, where digital platforms rapidly mobilised public sentiment without centralised planning (McQuail, 2000).
THE SEPTEMBER 2025 GEN Z MOVEMENT: A CASE STUDY
The Trigger: Social Media Ban
On 4 September 2025, the Nepali government, led by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli imposed a ban on 26 social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter (X), citing their failure to register with local authorities (Baral, 2025). This followed a public notice on 28 August 2025 urging compliance with tax and regulatory frameworks, which tech companies largely ignored. For instance, X stated it would not
register in a country “prone to corruption, ” a claim disclosed by then Communications Minister Prithivi Subba Gurung (Bhudathoki,2025).
The ban coincided with a viral anticorruption campaign on platforms like TikTok, exposing the lavish lifestyles of politicians’ children (“nepo kids”). Two days prior, infographics with slogans like ‘Your voice matters’, “If Indonesia can, Nepal cantoo”, and “We are not poor, we are robbed. And robbed people have the right” weredisseminated across Reddit, X, Facebook,Instagram, and TikTok, going viral as the ban deadline neared. These were not limited to Nepali users; for example, strategic posts in foreign languages, such as a German one stating ‘Mit friedlichen Protesten erreicht man gar nichts… diesen Politikern muss man Angst einjagen’ (meaning’Peaceful protests achieve nothing… these politicians need to be scared’),incited violence and were later deleted, suggesting coordinated efforts to evade detection.
A particularly inflammatory video (Tekpana, 2025), showing a Koshi Province minister’s vehicle striking a teenager at a zebra crossing in Lalitpur district on 6 September 2025, further fueled public outrage. Oli’s
defence of the minister intensified discontent, particularly among Gen Z, who viewed the government as arrogant and unaccountable. As Sudhir Sharma, former editor-in-chief of Kantipur, observed, “There was a growing sense that the simmering anger among the people could, at any moment, erupt into a collective explosion” (Sharma, S., personal communication, September 22, 2025). The social media ban, intended to suppress dissent, instead acted as a catalyst, triggering widespread protests within days (Acharya,2025).
Sahayo Ranjit, a journalist associated with Bizmandu, observes that Balendra Shah, along with Kathmandu-centric influencers, celebrities, and certain social media enthusiasts from the Nepali diaspora, played a significant role in disseminating information that fueled the movement. In their spontaneous and uncoordinated efforts to spread information,they failed to anticipate the potential consequences. It was only after the movement escalated into incidents of looting and vandalism that they appealed for an end to the destruction. By then, however, the agitated crowd was no longer in a position to heed their call (Ranjit, S., personal communication,October 2, 2025).
Mobilisation Through Social Media and Gaming Applications
Despite the ban, Gen Z activists used Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to access restricted platforms, while TikTok and Viber registered in Nepal, remained operational.Gaming applications like Discord became critical for coordination, with over 145, 000 users joining servers like “Hami Nepal”to plan protests and discuss strategies (Dhakal, 2025). Initially, Gen Z-named pages were activated, prioritising radical actions like burning the House of Representatives. ‘Hami Nepal’ only became active in the final moments before demonstrations, releasing instructional videos on how to conduct protests. Sudan Gurung issued a video message on 7 September,spread across all platforms. Apart from Hami Nepal, no other groups appeared organised. Sabal Gautam and Purushottam Yadav amplified the movement through their ‘Awaken Nepal Campaign’ on TikTok, using hashtags like‘#NepoKidsTrend’ and ‘#YouthAgainstCorruption’ to highlight corruption. Similarly, Sudan Gurung’s call toaction via the ‘Hami Nepal’ page, stating,“September 8 is not just another day… This is our time; this is our fight, ” galvanised youth participation, with a Discord QR code shared as the ‘Central Communication Channel for the Protest’. Amid this, Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah’s posts inspired the movement. On 7 September, he wrote on Facebook: “Tomorrow’s rally is clearly spontaneous and belongs to Gen Z… they have my full support.
Dear Gen Z, tell me what kind of country you want to see?” On 9 September, he added: “This is purely a Gen Z movement… Now, your generation will have to lead the country. Be prepared!”
On 8 September, protests erupted in Kathmandu and other cities, driven by hashtags like #UnbanNepal and #GenZNepal. The movement gained momentum when police fired on protesters, killing 19–22 youths. Viral videos of these incidents drew broader societal participation, including non-Gen Z groups. Within 48 hours, protesters set fire to Parliament, the Supreme Court, and Oli’s residence, forcing his resignation and the dissolution of Parliament. Former Chief Justice Sushila Karki was appointed interim Prime Minister, with elections scheduled for March 2026 (Giri, 2025). Hami Nepal expressed thanks for Karki’s selection via a social media post. Miraj Dhungana, a 24-yearold activist, reflected, “We never imagined the movement would take such a drastic turn… We thought the Prime Minister would invite us for talks and address our demands”(Dhungana, 2025).
The pre-protest activity reveals how social media built a foundation for the movement, blending spontaneous viral content with strategic incitement, potentially from external sources. Foreign language posts suggest efforts to obscure origins and incite violence, aligning with McQuail’s unplanned effects but hinting at hidden intentionality. Figures like Balen Shah and Sudan Gurung’s post bridged digital inspiration and real-world guidance, amplifying the movement’s legitimacy but also revealing how influencers can shape unplanned effects into structured demands.
The Role of Misinformation and Conspiracy Theories The movement’s reliance on social media led to a surge of misinformation, exacerbating political instability. Acharya (2025) categorises this misinformation into five types:misrepresenting foreign videos as Nepali events, exaggerating protest-related deaths, misattributing security forces’ actions, spreading cultural or religious disinformation, and amplifying false claims by political leaders.For example, misinformation linking the Hilton Hotel to Ex PM of Nepal Sher BahadurDeuba’s son led to its destruction.
Similarly, Shrestha (2025) has presented some facts about the use of social media to incite the Gen-Z demonstrations. For example, on September 9-10, Subash Ghimire’sFacebook post was found to be sponsored, in which it was written – ‘The Nepali Army is in final preparations to take power and make Balen the Prime Minister of the interim government…’ This kind of message was viewed on the screens of more than 400, 000 people by paying money on Facebook. Similarly, from the Facebook account named Gokul Guragain, it was posted – ‘On September 9, all the big corrupt leaders’ houses and party offices must be burned. Gen-Z will not stop now. Now move forward. Nepali Army/Police, support GenZ, leave your guns and bullets in your barracks and come. ‘ This violence-inciting post was also found to be boosted by paying money. According to the technical analysis done by Shrestha, the same page sponsored a post on the same day saying'(Former Prime Minister) KP Oli’s death registration must happen this week.’ From this page, videos of arson, calls for Balen to be Prime Minister, and monarchy-supporting posts were also sponsored.When checking ‘Profile Transparency’, the location of these users appears to be the neighbouring country India (Shrestha, U., personal communication, September 25, 2025).
Geopolitical conspiracies further complicated the narrative. Oli’s August 2025 meetings with Chinese and Russian leaders, followed by the social media ban, sparked speculation about Chinese influence, while messages from the Dalai Lama (September13, 2025) and Tibet’s exiled government (September 15, 2025) raised suspicions of Western involvement. Senior Journalist Kishore Nepal (personal communication,September 25, 2025) noted, “While the movement began on social media, it took on geopolitical dimensions” due to the ban and international relations involving China, India, and the United States. These narratives, amplified by social media, underscored the challenges of managing digital activism in a geopolitically sensitive region. In the meantime, Nepal’s newsrooms also fell victim to misleading news. For example, on 11 September, after incidents of arson and vandalism, ‘Nepal Press’ wrote –’Rastrapati Paudel Jangi Addama’ (English:’President Paudel at Army Headquarters’). On the other hand, Online Khabar published news with the title ‘Shital Niwasmai Chhan Rastrapati’ (English: ‘President is at Sheetal Niwas itself’). The news written by Nepal Press, including the context that the President was taken into control by the army, later proved to be false. The similar day, the government-controlled news agency National News Agency (RSS) disseminated news that the wife of former Prime Minister Jhalanath Khanal died in a fire. Which proved to be wrong.
While reporting on the events in Nepal, several international media outlets inaccurately characterized the uprising as a “movement against the social media ban.” As Ranjit (personal communication, October 2, 2025)
notices, the Gen Z movement was, in fact, initiated as a call for good governance and a protest against corruption—an aspect largely overlooked by international media. This misrepresentation was later corrected, and the tone of international coverage shifted following widespread social media criticism directed at mainstream global outlets.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:MCQUAIL’S SHORT-TERM UNPLANNED EFFECTS
Denis McQuail’s media effects framework provides a lens for analysing the 2025 Gen Z movement. McQuail systematically categorized the effects of media. According to his theoretical framework, media effects can be broadly understood along two key dimensions: time span (short-term or long-term) and intentionality (planned or unplanned). This conceptual model, structured as a 2×2 matrix, provides a systematic explanation of how andunder what conditions media exert their influence (McQual, 2000). In Towards a Sociology of Mass Communications, McQuail explained that short-term unplanned effects occur when media, without prior design,rapidly influence public behaviour or opinion, often in response to unexpected events (McQuail, 2000).
The 2025 Nepal movement aligns with this framework. The social media ban, intended to curb dissent, triggered an unplanned backlash, amplified by platforms like TikTok and Discord. Within 48 hours, these platforms transformed public outrage into a mass movement, leading to Oli’s resignation. Nepal (personal communication, September 25, 2025) described the movement as “not a planned endeavor” but an “impulsive outburst of discontent” driven by dissatisfaction with corruption. Miraj Dhungana echoed this, stating, “This was a headless movement… We weren’t prepared for what happened after the revolution” (Dhungana, 2025). This rapid,disorganised mobilisation reflects the “shortterm unplanned” nature of social media’s impact, bypassing traditional media’s agendasetting role.
As Ranjit (personal communication, October 2, 2025) notes, the Gen Z movement stands as a striking example of how swiftly social media posts, comments, and calls to action can mobilize and influence the public. However, he further observes that when it comes to immediately halting such unplanned movements, the same social media platforms often prove ineffective, as people tend to accept the initial calls as truth and subsequently fail trecognize or reconsider the consequences that follow.
THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL MEDIA
The 2025 movement exposed the declining relevance of traditional media in Nepal.
Mainstream outlets, grappling with financial constraints post-COVID-19, relied heavily on social media content for coverage (CMR,2021). Newspapers like Kantipur and National television channels incorporated viral videos and hashtags, often prioritising sensationalism over objectivity. The closure of Englishlanguage broadcasts by major media houses, such as KMG Group, and the reduction of newspaper pages to fewer than 12 underscored the industry’s challenges.
Traditional media initially supported the social media ban, anticipating a return of advertising revenue. However, this backfired, alienating audiences and increasing reliance on social media for news. Dahal (2025) notes that 91.39% of respondents view social media as a direct challenge to newsrooms, with 90.21% believing it has overtaken traditional media’s agenda-setting role. Kishore Nepal observed, “Mainstream media and online-based media have failed to address public expectations… allowing discontent to find a platform on social media” (personal communication, September25, 2025). This shift reflects a global trend where social media’s immediacy disrupts traditional journalism. With the growing access to and influence of the internet, there has been a noticeable diversification in information flow on the one hand, and a decline in reliance on traditional media on the other. In particular, countless social media pages, podcasts, and YouTube channels—such as RONB and Nepali Comments—have transformed the habits of information consumers. The shift in media consumption patterns has also posed a challenge to the traditional, gatekeeping-based model of news media. Even the popular figure among youth in Nepal Mayor Balendra Shah has notably minimized his engagement with traditional news platforms, opting instead to utilize social media, as the primary conduit for disseminating official statements, policy decisions, and direct public communication. Consequently, mainstream news outlets have increasingly relied solely on his social media posts as the foundational source for their news coverage. This pattern was clearly evidenced when his call for the dissolution of the House of Representatives and his demand that the Gen-Z movement should negotiate exclusively with the military establishment—made during the protests on September 9—were reported by the mainstream media, drawing their information exclusively from his public social media updates.
At a time when a call for the defence of the Constitution and the rule of law was necessitated by the prevailing crisis, the mainstream media also became swayed. For instance, on 9 September Kantipur Daily
published a special editorial titled, “Gen-zko aawaj suna, Balen netritwoma naya Nepalko margachitrama aghi bada (English: Listen to the voice of Gen Z, move forward on the roadmap for a new Nepal under Balen’s
leadership.” The most influential Nepali newsroom was thus swayed by social media. The special editorial even quoted a social media slogan, stating: “Balen, come and lead us out of the crisis.” The tendency observed in Kantipur was evident across all mainstream newsrooms.
IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES
The Gen Z movement demonstrated social media’s potential to drive rapid political change, aligning with McQuail’s theory of short-term unplanned effects. By mobilising youth and amplifying anti corruption narratives, digital platforms challenged Nepal’s entrenched political elite, fostering greater civic engagement. The movement’s success in ousting Oli highlights its role in promoting a more inclusive political system. However, its reliance on social media posed significant challenges.
Misinformation fueled violence and instability, with acts like the Hilton Hotel, schools, private property, business houses arson driven by false narratives (Shrestha, U., personal communication, September 25,2025). Nepal (personal communication, September 25, 2025) warned, “The current state of social media has also invited anarchy… with secondary agendas overtaking the original purpose.”
The movement’s geopolitical undertones, amplified by conspiracy theories, underscore
the need for critical media literacy. Sharma (personal communication, September 22,2025) noted, “The groundwork for rebellion or anarchy in the country was already being laid” before the protests, reflecting governance failures that social media exploited. The fragmented aftermath of the protests created governance hurdles, as noted: “Now, many groups are coming forward claiming they will form the government. This has made it difficult for the government itself to function” (Dhungana, 2025). This reflects the risks of disorganised digital activism in sustaining political stability. To response it, according to all experts, the interim government must address digital rights and anti-corruption measures to sustain public trust, as failure to do so could lead to further upheavals. Mainstream media must also prioritise credibility to regain relevance.
CONCLUSION
Nepal’s 2025 Gen Z movement illustrates the transformative power of social media in driving short-term, unplanned political change, as conceptualised by Denis McQuail (2000). By leveraging platforms like Facebook, TikTok, X, Instagram, and Discord, young activists by passed traditional media and political structures to demand accountability. The movement’s rapid success in ousting a government underscores digital activism’s potential to reshape political processes. However, risks of misinformation, violence, and geopolitical manipulation highlight the need for responsible digital engagement. As one observer noted, “The current Gen Z rebellion was built upon this very foundation” of prior discontent and digital activism (Shrestha, U., personal communication,September 25, 2025).
The current fragmentation of Gen Z groups (Onlinekhabar, 2025) and their scattered demands on social media has generated widespread confusion. The overwhelming flow of information, coupled with a general lack of trust, has led to growing questions about the movement itself. As discussions and notices continue to multi plyonline, the very legitimacy and purpose of the movement have increasingly come under scrutiny. As Nepal navigates its post-movement transition, the interplay between social media and traditional media remains critical. While digital platforms have democratised discourse, their unplanned effects can lead to both empowerment and chaos. Policymakers and media institutions must foster a balanced ecosystem promoting transparency, accountability, and media literacy to harness the potential of Nepal’s digital generation.
*Rishikesh Dahal
Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Journalism and Mass
Communication, Tribhuvan University
